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NOTES
Unauthorized Practice of Law
By Collection Agencies
INTRODUCTION
A problem vital to the future of the legal profession is the practice
of law by unauthorized individuals and by corporations.'
It is paradoxical, but nevertheless a fact, that when a lawyer is needed
to untangle a mess created as the result of unauthorized practice, the victim,
more often than not, rages against the law. The lawyer of course is the
symbol of the law, and to hear the victim later tell it, it is something like
'That a corporation may not practice law is established by both statute and common
law. OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.04 provides in its applicable part that "A corpora-
non may be formed for any purpose or purposes, other than the carrying
on the practice of any profession. " An oft cited case in which a corporation
was forbidden to practice law without reference to a statute is that of In re Co-opera-
tive Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 483, 92 N.E. 15, 16 (1910) The court said:
The relation of attorney and client is that of master and servant in a
limited and dignified sense, and it involves the highest trust and confidence.
It cannot be delegated without consent and it cannot exist between an
attorney employed by a corporation to practice law for it, and a client
of the corporation, for he would be subject to the directions of the corpora-
tion and not to the directions of the client. There would be neither
contract nor privity between him and the client and he would not owe
even the duty of counsel to the actual litigant.
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this, "And I had to pay that damn lawyer so much to get title to my own
property.1
2
Among those engaged in such practice are banks, trust companies,
collection agencies, realtors and accountants. Every lawyer interested in
the preservation of the integrity of his profession should feel duty bound
to acquaint himself with this problem and learn how he can best cope
with it. There are certain general principles regarding the unauthorized
practice of law which apply whether the practice is by an individual or a
corporation. While these principles are embodied in this note, the basic
purpose of the author is to review the handling of the problem with
specific reference to collection agencies.
RIGHT OF ATroNLys To Acr
It is the attorney who must first judge the merits of any case and de-
cide whether or not suit should be commenced. Once it has been de-
termined to bring suit the attorney, as an officer of the court, must aid
the court in the proper application of the law to the case. Both the
litigant and the court have a right to expect that the attorney will be able
to perform these duties. But "persons unlearned in the law can neither
aid a litigant nor the court. ,3
The strict regulation of a profession such as law is in the public in-
terest, for if left uncontrolled it might develop methods and practices
inimical to the public welfare.4 The public interest demands that no
person hold himself out to the public as qualified to render legal services
for others unless he is in fact so qualified.5 Thus the right to practice
law is a privilege or franchise not open to every person. It is a privilege
of a personal nature, limited to persons of good moral character, possess-
mg special qualifications ascertained and certified after a long course of
study, both general and professional. It is conferred only for merit, can-
not be assigned or inherited, but must be earned by hard study and good
conduct.6 The possession of these qualifications is evidenced by a license.
The primary purpose of the license is to protect the public. A
secondary purpose is protection to the person practicing the particular
profession, and to encourage them to better prepare for that service.7
'Green, Unauthorized Practice as it Affects Public Relations, 28 OHio BAR 686
(1955).
'Nelson v. Smith, 107 Utah 382, 386, 154 P. 2d 634, 637 (1944).
'In re Lyon, 301 Mass. 30, 16 N.E.2d 74 (1938).
'Bump v. District Court, 232 Iowa 623, 5 N.W.2d 914 (1942); Bay County Bar
Ass'n v. Finance System Inc., 345 Mich. 434, 76 N.W.2d 23 (1956).
'State ex rel. McKittrick v. C.S. Dudley & Co., 340 Mo. 852, 102 S.W.2d 895
(1937); Land Tide Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E.
650 (1934); In re Morse, 98 Vt. 85, 126 At. 550 (1924).
"State ex rel. Freebourn v. Merchants' Credit Service, 104 Mont. 76, 104, 66 P. 2d
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The practice of law is not a business. Allowing persons to make it
such by their unauthorized acts tends to bring the legal profession into
disrepute.8 It makes futile any attempts to maintain high standards of
education, training, character and strict accountability for unprofessional
acts.9 Licensed attorneys, therefore, not only have a right to bring suit
against one engaged in the unauthorized practice of law for the protec-
tion of their own interests, but also have a duty to do so in order to pre-
serve the integrity of the profession for the benefit of the public.10
SERVICES COLLECTION AGENCIES MAY PERFORM
Collection agencies perform functions which are both convenient and
necessary in the business world of today. That they are equipped to per-
form such functions is not questioned nor does the business of collecting
claims in and of itself constitute the practice of law." Such agencies may
solicit claims from creditors and collect them by sending out personal
collectors or by sending dun notices through the mail, and they may do
so on a commission basis.12
It has been held that such agencies may use blank notes, drafts, mort-
gages and similar blanks obtainable at any book store, the filling out of
which requires no particular legal knowledge and which is done as a part
of the general business of the agency without specific charge.13 One
court has said that a collection agent may be authorized by a creditor to
employ an attorney to represent the creditor, and if .the authorization is
unlimited, he can even agree upon the compensation to be paid for the
attorney's services. Under this arrangement, however, the creditor rather
than the agency becomes the client and all control over the claim must be
transferred to the attorney and removed from the agency.14 In Massa-
chusetts it was held that a collection agent could threaten the debtor with
suit by the creditor providing the creditor expressly directed the agent to
337, 343 (1937); modified by, Rae v. Cameron, 112 Mont. 159, 114 P. 2d 1060
(1951)
' State Bar v. Retail Credit Ass n, 170 Okla. 246, 37 P. 2d 954 (1934).
'For the Ohio requirements see: Rule XIV, The Supreme Court of Ohio, Admission
to the Bar; Rule XXVIII, The Supreme Court of Ohio, Rules of Professional Con-
duct; OHIO REV. CODE §§ 4705.01 to 4705.06. The statute prohibiting the false
representation of oneself as an attorney is OHIo REv. CODE § 4705.07
"Bump v. Barnett, 235 Iowa 308, 16 N.W 2d 579 (1944)
'Public Service Traffic Bureau v. Haworth Marble Co., 40 Ohio App. 255, 178
N.E. 703 (1931)
- State ex rel. McKittrick v. C.S. Dudley & Co., 340 Mo. 852, 102 S.W 2d 895
(1937); Goodman v. Provident Credit Co., 10 Ohio Op. 77, 25 Ohio L. Abs. 492
(C.P 1937).
"Depew v. Wichita Ass'n of Credit Men, 142 Kan. 403, 49 P 2d 1041 (1935)
14 State ex rel. District Attorney v. Lytton, 172 Tenn. 91, 110 S.W 2d 313 (1937)
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do so without any advice to that effect by the agent himself. Such
measures do not constitute the practice of law even if used habitually.15
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It
essentially involves the performance of legal services for others, usually
for gain, and includes the giving of legal counsel and advice, the prepara-
tion of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special pro-
ceedings and the management of such actions and proceedings before
judges and courts. It also embraces conveyancing and the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds by which legal rights are secured and which
require the application of legal skill.' 0
UNAUTHORIZED PRACnCES BY COLLECTION AGENCIES
Ultimately, the determination of what acts do constitute the practice
of law is exclusively for the courts. The courts, apart from any statute,
have inherent power to inquire into the conduct of any person, individ-
ual, lay agency or corporation, to determine whether he or it is usurping
the functions of an officer of the court and illegally engaging in the
practice of law.17 Therefore, the best means of ascertaining the unau-
thorized practices of collection agencies is to study the leading cases in
the area.
A corporation, the avowed object of which was the "collection of ac-
counts and bills receivable due its members and subscribers," was found
to be guilty of the unauthorized practice of law in State ex rel. Lundin v.
Merchants' Protectwe Corp.'s In reaching its conclusion the court looked
beyond the articles of incorporation to the actual conduct of the business.
It found that the corporation's membership certificates recited that the
members were entitled to free legal advice in all matters, business and
personal, to be given by attorneys retained by the corporatwn. The at-
torneys were compensated by the payment of one dollar of each ten dol-
lar membership fee solicited and received by the corporation.
In a California case against the same corporation, the court found that
the attorneys so retained were really the agents of the corporation which
hired them and not the agents of the clients who were the members.
Thus, the corporation attempted to do indirectly that which it was for-
'In re Lyon, 301 Mass. 30, 16 N.E. 2d 74 (1938).
"
8People ex rel. Iawyers' Inst. v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209
Pac. 363 (1922); Eley v. Miller, 7 Ind. App. 529, 34 N.E. 836 (1893); In re Lyon,
301 Mass. 30, 16 N.E. 2d 74 (1938); Judd v. City Trust and Savings Bank, 133
Ohio St. 81, 12 N.E. 2d 288 (1937); Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken,
129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650 (1934); Nelson v. Smith, 107 Utah 382, 154 P 2d
634 (1944).
17 In re Morse, 98 Vt. 85, 126 Atl. 550 (1924); Richmond Assn of Credit Men
Inc. v. Bar Ass'n, 167 Va. 327, 189 S.E. 153 (1937).
's 105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694 (1919).
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bidden to do directly- practice law. The court found that to be an eva-
sion which the law will not tolerate.19 Approval of such an evasion would
allow both the corporation and the attorney together to do that which
neither is legally authorized to do alone. The corporation could soliat
the business which the attorney could not do, and the attorney could en-
force the daims in court which the corporation could not do.20 A corpo-
ration may not practice law even though all of its directors and officers
are duly licensed attorneys.2 '
The use of simulated process by collection agencies has drawn con-
siderable attention from the courts. Judge Welch provides an apt de-
scription of these documents in his opinion in State Bar v. Retail Credit
Assn.
Such documents are prepared with generous use of large black type,
large red type, and glaring underscoring of legal phrases, with very con-
spicuous seals attached. They are designed to terrorize the individual
addressed, and to present to him as a monster of retribution the law, the
courts of justice, and various and sundry processes, some legal and judicial,
and some extrajudicial, and unknown to the law, and all claimed by de-
fendants (a collection agency) to be subservient to defendants in carrying
out their threats. While it is hardly possible that any such threats should
be taken seriously by an enlightened people, that is no argument that
such association has the right to engage in such chicanery in the name of the
law, and under the pretense of legal and judicial sanction, and with a pre-
tended authority and privilege to so employ and use legal and judicial
process and procedure."
Such parodies of the orderly process of law should never be permitted.
Certainly no attorney would be allowed to adopt such tactics.2 3 In some
states their use has been prohibited by criminal statute.24
"People ex rel. Lawyers Inst. v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209
Pac. 363 (1922)
' Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men Inc. v. Bar Ass'n, 167 Va. 327, 189 S.E. 153
(1937)
'People ex rel. Los Angeles Bar Ass'n v. California Protective Corp., 76 Cal. App.
354, 244 Pac. 1089 (1926).
- 170 Okla. 246, 248, 37 P.2d 954, 956 (1934).
' Bump v. Barnett, 235 Iowa 308, 16 N.W.2d 579 (1944); In re Weiss, 176 Ad.
924 (Pa. 1935); In re Swihart, 42 S.D. 628, 177 N.W 364 (1920)
2OHo REv. CODE § 2901.39 provides in its applicable portion that:
No person shall knowingly send, deliver, mail, or in any manner
cause to be sent, delivered, or mailed, any paper or document simulating
or intended to simulate a summons, complaint, warrant, writ, or other
court process of any kind, with intent to obtain from another person any
money, article of personal property, or other thing of value.
Also see N.Y. PEN CODE §§ 551, 551a. The following examples of simulated
processes are taken from Bump v. Barnett, 235 Iowa 308, 310, 16 N.W 2d 579,
581 (1944)
Entitled in red ink
"Final Notice Before Legal or Statutory Action' giving the title, "W
[September
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In Depew v. Wichita Ass'n of Credit Men25 the Kansas Supreme
Court held that the filing of mimeographed bills of particulars m justice
of the peace courts, where attorneys were not required, was such a prepa-
ration of legal instruments as to constitute the unauthorized practice of
law. The same result has been reached with regard to the use of blanks
Thomas Barnet v .----- (naming debtor) which paper advised debtor
that "Public Service and the party of the first part" were sending the notice
"in order that you may make satisfactory arrangements with the proper
authority, W Thomas Barnett, assignee, plaintiff and show good and
sufficient cause why such action should not be brought for the purpose
of securing judgment for the sum of $ ------ account of ------
(name of creditor) original creditor. Said judgment to be collected and
enforced with powers, privileges and penalties given by law at the full
discretion of the aforesaid W Thomas Barnett, assignee, Pltff." The
paper was impressed with a red seal, "Public Service, W Thomas Barnett,"
and at the bottom appeared this curious language:
"Know All Men by These Presents."
"Resolved, and be it enacted, that Plaintiff shall not commence, or
cause to be commenced, any court action, with the judgment thus obtained,
and in all cases shall give the party or parties against whom judgment is
proposed to be taken, a notice of not less than ten (10) days from the
commencement of such action, and it's further required that a copy of this
special resolution shall be displayed with the service of such notice."
"The laws of this state provide that all persons found guilty of obtain-
ing goods or anything of value under false pretense or misrepresentauon
shall be pumshed by fine or mprisonment, or both, as the cases shall be."
Another form used by Barnett:
State of Iowa
County of Polk
- - (name of creditor)
W Thomas Barnett, Assignee
VS.
Creditor,
Debtor Amount Due $ .......
To the above named debtor:
You are hereby notified that the said creditor is about to institute
legal proceedings for the garnishment against you and your employer in
the courts having jurisdiction over the subject matter. You and your em-
ployer will be summoned to appear before said courts. Your employer's
time books will be summoned into court by subpoena duces tecum to
show what is due you and that so much of same may be applied toward
the payment of this debt as provided by statute.
Any arrangement as to settlement you may wish to make in avoidance
of the proceedings above menuoned should be consummated at this office
within a period of 5 days from the date hereof.
Dated at Des Moines, Iowa, this 15th day of March, 1944.
W Thomas Barnett, Assignee
503 Southern Surety Building
(SEAL) Des Moines 9, Iowa
Ph. 3-5265
Z142 Kan. 403, 49 P. 2d 1041 (1935).
19571
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
and the sending of solicitations of proof of claims and powers of attor-
ney in bankruptcy proceedings. 26
Representations in the letterhead of a collection corporation that it
had attorneys in its employ and could garnish wages and attach property
was held to be the practice of law without a license in State ex rel. Free-
bourn v. Merchants' Credit Service, Inc.2 7  The form used by the de-
fendant corporation was an alleged assignment of the claim to the corpo-
ration which authorized it to bring suit in its own name as the real party
in interest and to select, engage and compensate the attorney. The han-
dling of the suit and settlement of it were left to the discretion of the
corporation. The court held that an assignment for the purpose of col-
lection was merely a simulated assignment and in the absence of an ex-
press statute such assignee was not the real party in interest, but was
merely representing the assignors and practicing law.2 8
A careful reading (of the assignment) discloses that it is a mere cloak
to screen the ulterior purpose of the assignee to authorize it to appear in
court without an attorney. It is a mere subterfuge calculated to deceive
the court and to authorize an unauthorized person to appear for the corpo-
ration in a court which requires an authorized attorney to make such ap-
pearance. 2
There are several leading cases which hold that an assignment, even
for purposes of suit, does qualify the assignee as the real party in interest.
This principle is immediately restricted, however, to casual assignments
for purposes of procedural convenience. These courts too refused to al-
low such assignments to be used as a subterfuge to circumvent the policy
of the courts and the legislatures as to the unauthorized practice of law.30
As to the problem of solicitation of claims in bankruptcy as the practice of law and
the power of state courts to control it, there is some confusion. For a list of cases
pro and con see, XVII Unauthorized Practice News, No. 1, p. 17 (1951)
1104 Mont. 76, 66 P. 2d 337 (1937), modified by, Rae v. Cameron, 112 Mont.
159, 114 P 2d 1060 (1941)
'This is the very point on which Rae v. Cameron modified the Freebourn case.
For other cases holding that an assignee for purposes of collection only is not a real
party in interest see: Gaffney v. Tammany, 72 Conn. 701, 46 Atd. 156 (1900);
Abrams v. Cureton, 74 N.C. 523 (1876); Brown v. Ginn, 66 Ohio St. 316, 64
N.E. 123 (1902)
"State ex rel. Freebourn v. Merchants Credit Service, 104 Mont. 76, 106, 66 P. 2d
337, 344 (1937); modified by, Rae v. Cameron, 112 Mont. 159, 114 P 2d 1060
(1941)
'Bump v. Barnett, 235 Iowa 308, 16 N.W 2d 579 (1944), Bay County Bar Assn
v. Finance System Inc., 345 Mich. 434, 76 N.W 2d 23 (1956); Nelson v. Smith,
107 Utah 382, 154 P 2d 634 (1944) The Bay County case contains an excellent
discussion of case law with reference to the unauthorized practice of law by collec-
tion agencies. Contra, Clark v. Andrews, 109 Cal. App. 2d 193, 240 P 2d 330
(1952); Cohn v. Thompson, 128 Cal. App. 783, 16 P 2d 364 (1932); Washing-
ton State Bar Ass n v. Merchants' Rating and Adjusting Co., 183 Wash. 611, 49
[September
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An Ohio conmmon pleas court has held that even a purported outright sale
of a claim to a collection agency for cash and a note promising to pay a
creditor a stipulated percentage of any sums recovered, does not make
such assignee a real party in interest so that he may maintain suit in his
own name.3 ' The test of whether or not a person is using such assign-
ments to carry on the business of practicing law is not the volume or
number of transactions but rather the intent to engage in the business as
a profession. Proof of numerous transactions coupled with evidence of
solicitation and advertising "makes irresistible the conclusion that the
individual is regularly engaged in the practice."32
Where such assignments were solicited by a lay agency with the un-
derstanding that suit would be instituted by it and collection would be
enforced by legal process, the agency was guilty of the unauthorized prac-
tice of law. It was falsely holding itself out as ready, willing and able
to practice law and perform the office of an attorney.33 Where, in ad-
dition, the agency's fee was to be a percentage of the amount collected
upon the claim assigned, the contract was held champertous and unen-
forceable, and it was immaterial whether the champertor was an attorney
or not.3 4 Where the action was brought by the champertor in his own
name as assignee, the champerty could be interposed by the debtor as a
defense.3 5
In Bump v. Barnett36 the Iowa court held that despite a statute mak-
ing it unnecessary to be an attorney to practice in a justice of the peace
court, a lay agency still could not make a business of practicing in such
courts. It held that the purpose of the statute was not to encourage the
growth of "justice court lawyers." In fact, since the justices themselves
may not be lawyers, it would seem even more important that those regu-
larly appearing in such courts be well versed in the law. An Ohio com-
mon pleas court, after mentioning the concurrent jurisdiction of common
pleas and justice of the peace courts over claims of from one hundred to
three hundred dollars, presented this interesting possibility-
If the contention of the defendant were sustained it would present
P. 26 (1935). In his opinion in the Bay County case Chief Justice Dethmers dis-
tinguished all three of these cases.
'Goodman v. Provident Credit Co., 10 Ohio Op. 77, 25 Ohio L. Abs. 492 (C.P.
1937).
'Bump v. Barnett, 235 Iowa 308, 16 N.W 2d 579, 583, (1944)
'Berk v. State, 225 Ala. 324, 142 So. 832 (1932); State ex ral. v. Retail Credit
Men's Ass'n., 163 Tenn. 450, 43 S.W 2d 918 (1931)
'Bump v. Barnett, 235 Iowa 308, 16 N.W 2d 579 (1944); Reece v. Kyle, 49 Ohio
St. 475, 31 N.E. 747 (1892).
'Davy v. Fidelity and Casualty Ins. Co., 78 Ohio St. 256, 85 N.E. 504 (1908).
'235 Iowa 308, 16 N.W 2d 579 (1944).
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the peculiar situation wherein one prosecuting or defending an action
in a justice court for three hundred dollars would not be practicing law
while one engaged in the prosecution or defense of an action in the Court
of Common Pleas in the sum of one hundred dollars would be engaged in
the practice of law. Such a conclusion in the judgment of the court would
not be founded upon law, logic or reasonm'
The court enjoined a layman from further practice in justice courts.
As has already been seen, a collection agency may not do indirectly
that which it is forbidden to do directly. Courts have held that such an
agency is no less guilty of practicing law when it hires and in any way
controls a licensed attorney, than when it attempts to perform the office
itself. What one cannot legally do himself he cannot do through his
agents. The relation of attorney and client is one of trust and confidence
and no third party can be permitted to intervene between them in any
way.38 The employment of an attorney by the agency, for its client, is
the practice of law whether the attorney is paid a salary or a fee by the
agency. In either case he remains the employee of the agency and not of
the client.39 An attempt to evade this conclusion was thwarted in State
ex rel. McKittrck v. C. S. Dudley & Co.40 There, the agency stated to
the client that the corporation's services would not include legal work
but when the corporation decided that a particular claim could be col-
lected only by suit, it requested the client to select an attorney. If the
client failed to select one the corporation did so itself. It informed such
attorney that he would be paid sixty per cent of the legal fee paid to the
corporation by the client. All correspondence was to be sent to the corpo-
ration and not to the client. The court held that this intervention con-
stituted the attorney the agent of the corporation and not of the client.
In a recent Kansas case, moreover, the collection of an attorney's fee from
the client and the retention of any portion of it by such an agency, was
held not in accord with good ethics.4 '
Injunction is a proper remedy for the unauthorized practice of aw.42
'Erskine v. Smith, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 488, 492 (C.P. 1940)
'Berk v. State, 225 Ala. 324, 142 So. 832 (1932); In re Shoe Manufacturer's Pro-
tective Ass'n, Inc., 295 Mass. 369, 3 N.E. 2d 746 (1936); Bay County Bar Ass'n v.
Finance System Inc., 345 Mich. 434, 76 N.W 2d 23 (1956); United Radio Inc. v.
Cotton, 61 Ohio App. 247, 22 N.E. 2d 532 (1938); State ex tel. v. Retail Credit
Mens Assn, 163 Tenn. 450, 43 S.W 2d 918 (1931); Nelson v. Smith, 107 Utah
382, 154 P. 2d 634 (1944)
State ex tel. v. Retail Credit Men's Ass'n, 163 Tenn. 450, 43 S.W 2d 918 (1931)
40340 Mo. 852, 102 S.W 2d 895 (1937).
'Depew v. Wichita Ass'n of Credit Men, 142 Kan. 403, 49 P.2d 1041 (1955).
'
2Bump v. Barnett, 235 Iowa 308, 16 N.W 2d 579 (1944); Depew v. Wichita Ass'n
of Credit Men, 142 Kan. 403, 49 P.2d 1041 (1935); State Bar v. Retail Credit
Assn, 170 Okla, 246, 37 P 2d 954 (1934); Nelson v. Smith, 107 Utah 382, 154
P. 2d 634 (1944).
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This equitable remedy is not barred by the existence of a statute making
such practice criminal
3
ACrION BY ATToRNEYs
The problem is obvious but the question of what "that damn lawyer"
can do about it remains. A reading of the foregoing cases impresses one
with the fact that many of the objectionable acts of the collection agencies
concerned could not have been carried on without the aid of attorneys
who were willing to accept "sweetheart" arrangements with the offending
agencies, and who allowed themselves to be used and advertised by such
agencies. These attorneys present the greatest danger to the legal pro-
fession. Their acts are unprofessional and in violation of the canons of
professional ethics.44
Members of the bar interested in preserving and promoting the stature
of the legal profession would do well to follow the course of action out-
lined by Merritt W Green of the Ohio Bar Association.4 5 Mr. Green
recommends that besides being aware of the problem and learning what
constitutes unauthorized practice, an attorney should never permit his
name or his services to be used in aid of or to make possible unauthorized
practice. Affirmatively, he should have -the courage and the integrity to
document and transmit to his bar association every incident of unauthorized
practice which comes to his attention.
PREVENTION OR PROSECUTION
Much can be done to prevent unauthorized practice by the continuing
education of the bar and by joint information meetings with representa-
tives of the various groups whose normal business practices are closely
related to the practice of law.46 As strict a line as possible should be
drawn between legitimate business practices and the practice of law, but
it should not be presumed that those engaged in unauthorized practices
are acting in bad faith. In many instances such persons are merely mis-
' Dworken v. Apartment House Owners Ass n, 38 Ohio App. 265, 176 N.E. 577
(1931); State Bar v. Retail Credit Ass'n, 170 Okla. 246, 37 P. 2d 954 (1934):
Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 41 Wash. 2d 697,
251 P. 2d 619 (1952).
" Turley, Realism and Romanticism in the Philosophy of Illegal Practice, 20 TEXAS
B. J. 23 (1957); Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Ass n, especially
canons 27, 34, 35, and 47. Rule XXVIII, Supreme Court of Ohio, Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct, which "commends" the canons of the American Bar Ass n. This
rule supplements but not not supplant the canons of the American Bar Ass'n. ac-
cording to In re Petition of the Committee on Rule 28, 29 Ohio N. P. (n.s.) 291
(Ct. App. 1932).
4i27 OHio BAR 1046 (1954).
"Peluso, An Unlawful Practice Program That Works, 26 N.Y. BAR BULL. 67
(1954).
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